Federal agents arrested 65-year-old Gerald Eddie Brown Jr. in Jeffersonville, Indiana, accusing the former U.S. Air Force officer of secretly training pilots from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) without the required U.S. government permission. Prosecutors say Brown — a long‑time pilot who flew under the call sign “Runner” — provided specialized instruction that counts as a “defense service” under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). If proven, those actions would also breach the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and related export‑control rules.
Court filings portray a scheme in which Brown used intermediaries to arrange and mask the work, routing communications through a co‑conspirator with ties to people connected to China. Investigators specifically identify Stephen Su Bin — a Chinese national who previously pleaded guilty in the U.S. to conspiring to hack defense contractors and steal export‑controlled data — as part of the network of middlemen. According to prosecutors, the messages and documents they recovered referenced operational details and training techniques that would qualify as controlled technical information.
The legal framework is straightforward: under the AECA and ITAR, Americans may not transfer technical knowledge, operational tactics, or training that would materially improve a foreign military’s capabilities without a State Department license. Authorities contend the alleged instruction Brown planned and discussed would have required that authorization.
Brown’s military résumé is substantial. He spent more than 24 years on active duty, leaving the Air Force as a major after flying combat missions and serving as a fighter and simulator instructor on aircraft ranging from the F‑4 Phantom II to the A‑10 Thunderbolt II. Prosecutors also allege he later worked as a contract simulator instructor and provided training tied to modern platforms, including the F‑35 Lightning II.
That said, the public filings are uneven on timing and detail. The complaint contains inconsistent dates, and prosecutors have not laid out a complete chronology of travel, meetings, or the exact content and duration of any training. The case remains under active investigation, and officials say additional evidence or charges could follow as they examine intercepted communications and financial records.
Senior Justice Department and FBI officials framed the arrest as a deterrent: veterans and contractors who convey operational know‑how to foreign militaries without authorization risk criminal prosecution and pose potential national‑security threats. The government argues that even instructional exchanges — outside the transfer of physical weapons — can significantly boost a rival force’s effectiveness.
This matter highlights how export‑control laws reach beyond hardware to encompass expertise. For former service members and defense contractors, the case is a reminder to seek guidance and permits before sharing sensitive skills or material with foreign entities.