Nouri al‑Maliki’s nomination has thrown Iraq’s already fragile political scene into deeper uncertainty. The choice came from the Shia‑led Coordination Framework, but what followed was anything but straightforward: international warnings, talks of sanctions, and growing scepticism inside Iraq. The move has turned the question of who should lead into a broader contest over the country’s direction — domestically and between Washington and Tehran.
A crossroads between two powers
Iraq’s politics now sit squarely between U.S. and Iranian influence. Foreign pressure has seeped into what would normally be an internal bargaining process, shaping debates about cabinet composition, the role of militias, and the durability of state institutions. At stake is more than one politician’s record: the nomination is effectively a test of whether Baghdad can build a functioning government without widening internal rifts or alienating key international partners.
The stakes for ordinary Iraqis are tangible. Political limbo typically translates into stalled investment, strained public finances and weaker service delivery. Comparative studies of fragile states find that prolonged stalemate often erodes institutional capacity — a reality Iraqis already experience in delayed salaries, inconsistent medical supplies and interrupted reforms.
How Washington responded
Washington publicly rebuked the Coordination Framework’s endorsement and warned it might withdraw support if al‑Maliki became prime minister. The bloc, however, defended the move on January 31 as a domestic affair. That exchange has elevated fears about Iraq’s economic and diplomatic stability: cuts to foreign aid or security cooperation would squeeze public coffers and complicate anti‑corruption and service‑delivery efforts.
Diplomacy, personnel changes and signalling
Beyond public statements, the U.S. has adjusted its diplomatic posture. Reports of a reshuffle — including the removal of the U.S. special envoy for Iraq and reassignment of responsibilities — were noted by Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein on February 1. Such personnel moves are more than administrative; they’re strategic signals meant to raise the political cost of certain appointments. When combined with sanctions or the threat of reduced financial flows, these levers can shape Baghdad’s calculations.
Militias, PMF and parliamentary dynamics
Al‑Maliki’s critics point to his ties with Iran and his role in formalizing the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in 2014. The PMF’s semi‑official status created pathways for armed groups to gain political footholds; several militias now have parliamentary wings. Washington has made clear it will not engage with governments that include figures designated or sanctioned for links to terrorism — a stance that complicates coalition arithmetic when militia‑affiliated factions are significant players.
Even within the Coordination Framework, support for al‑Maliki is not uniform. Prominent figures — including Qais al‑Khazali, Ammar al‑Hakim and Haider al‑Abadi — reportedly harbour reservations, and some members have privately signalled openness to other candidates such as the incumbent prime minister or the intelligence chief. In Iraq’s fragmented landscape, an endorsement from a bloc like the CF cannot substitute for a parliamentary majority or the international relationships that sustain the economy.
Domestic bargaining and regional pressure
Iraq’s customary power‑sharing arrangements — presidency to a Kurd, premiership to a Shia, speakership to a Sunni — force extended negotiation when any side lacks consensus. That gives parties allied with armed groups leverage to block appointments or extract concessions, prolonging the formation of a cabinet and a governing program.
Outside actors amplify those pressures. Many Iraqis fear their country could become a proxy stage for U.S.‑Iran rivalry, narrowing the next government’s room for independent policymaking and reform. Analysts warn that renewed external influence could shape Baghdad’s foreign policy choices and limit its capacity to overhaul weak institutions.
The oil angle and fiscal leverage
Oil revenue remains Iraq’s lifeline and a persistent bargaining chip. Disputes over revenue sharing, export routes and budget allocations can paralyse negotiations and cripple public services. Because much of Iraq’s oil income is processed through financial systems with ties to the United States, Washington retains meaningful leverage over Baghdad’s fiscal stability — and, by extension, its ability to pay salaries and fund core services.
This fiscal reality informs the calculations of other actors, too. Kurdish leaders, for example, have highlighted the practical benefits of maintaining strong relations with Washington even as intra‑Shia disputes play out at home. That pragmatic stance helps explain why negotiations over nominations and the presidency are likely to drag on: parties must reconcile internal demands, militia influence, and international expectations.
What to watch next
Three developments will be decisive in the coming weeks:
– Whether the Coordination Framework can translate its endorsement into a parliamentary majority or whether rival blocs can block the nomination.
– How Washington and Tehran respond in concrete terms — beyond rhetoric — particularly around aid, sanctions and security cooperation.
– Whether other Iraqi political groups shift positions, crafting compromises that preserve both domestic stability and key foreign relationships.
If major actors refuse to compromise, the stalemate could persist, forcing further concessions on revenue sharing and security guarantees before a government can be formed. That outcome would prolong the uncertainty that undermines public services and tests the resilience of Iraq’s institutions. How Iraq navigates this moment — whether through accommodation or confrontation — will shape not only who leads the next government but how the country sits between two powerful neighbors and whether it can restore steady governance for its citizens.