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The international conversation about limiting strategic weapons has warmed up again, but experts warn that the United States has little prospect of securing Beijing’s participation in a new multilateral pact in the near term. The push for a three-way arrangement accelerated after the previous U.S.-Russia treaty expired last month, and leaders planned meetings intended to bridge gaps. Those plans were disrupted by global crises: President Donald Trump announced on March 16 and confirmed on March 17 that he would delay talks with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping to address the conflict in Iran, extending uncertainty about whether China will engage on nuclear arms control.
At the same time, bilateral diplomacy proceeded at lower levels. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent met with PRC Vice Premier He Lifeng on March 15 and March 16 to discuss trade mechanisms, including a proposed “Board of Trade” to manage investment and commerce as a prelude to leaders’ talks. Washington also opened new inquiries into unfair trade practices under Section 301, announced by U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer on March 11, prompting a PRC rebuttal on March 13. These economic tensions are central to U.S.-PRC bargaining and will shape strategic bargaining over any arms control framework.
Why China is unlikely to sign on quickly
Specialists emphasize several reasons Beijing is an unlikely partner for an immediate trilateral treaty. First, the PRC regards its nuclear arsenal as smaller and in a different development phase compared with the U.S. and Russia, which complicates parity-based negotiating frameworks. Second, domestic politics and strategic skepticism in both capitals reduce flexibility: China is wary of constraints that would freeze a modernization program it views as essential. Third, the timing of summits and external crises like the Iran conflict shift priorities away from arms reduction. In short, while there are many technical proposals for inclusion, practical and political obstacles limit short-term progress toward a binding nuclear arms control agreement.
Cross‑Strait pressure and influence operations
Tensions across the Taiwan Strait continue to feed broader mistrust. Taipei moved to preserve U.S. defense cooperation, authorizing the Executive Yuan to sign four expiring Letters of Offer and Acceptance before the March 15 deadline; those packages include systems such as HIMARS, Javelins, TOW missiles and the M109A7 howitzer and represent roughly 9 billion US dollars of equipment in a larger 11 billion package announced in December. Legislative debates and competing budgets in Taiwan will influence how quickly and confidently Taipei can pursue long-term modernization, and U.S. lawmakers have signaled concern about potential delays in Taipei’s special defense budgeting process.
GoLaxy leak and narrative warfare
Information operations have become a core element of the contest. A report published by Taiwanese think tank Doublethink Lab on March 4 — based on leaked documents obtained by Vanderbilt University in August 2026 — described a PRC-affiliated firm, GoLaxy, compiling a vast database of Taiwanese political, civic and religious figures to enable targeted influence campaigns. The leaked files reportedly included profiles on 170 politicians and millions of household records, along with tools to categorize subjects by ideology and “attitude toward China.” Analysts warn that this effort, coupled with plans for automated propaganda using artificial intelligence, poses sustained risks to Taiwan’s electoral integrity and public opinion.
Military patterns and legal tools
On the military front, the People’s Liberation Army resumed sorties around Taiwan after the PRC’s annual Two Sessions — the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference — which ran from March 4 through March 12. Activity levels around Taiwan have generally declined from peaks in 2026: incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ (the Air Defense Identification Zone) dropped substantially since January 2026, and daily sorties since March 11 have been fewer than earlier intensities. Observers assess the PLA may be reallocating operational tempo to training and joint operations, preserving incursions for signaling rather than constant pressure.
New laws and espionage cases
Legal instruments and counterintelligence developments also matter. Beijing passed a law on March 12 promoting “ethnic unity and progress” that includes penalties for actions deemed to undermine national unity, a provision Taipei fears could be used extraterritorially against independence supporters. Separately, Taiwan has prosecuted several espionage cases: a senior Coast Guard official, Chuang Tsung-hui, was convicted and sentenced on March 11 after detention in May 2026 and an indictment in August 2026; other personnel have faced penalties for passing sensitive data to PRC agencies. These cases underscore persistent intelligence vulnerabilities that feed cross‑Strait friction and complicate high-level diplomacy.
With trade disputes, military signaling, and sophisticated influence operations all in play, the diplomatic path to a three-way nuclear accord looks narrow in the months ahead. Summit scheduling, evolving crises such as the Iran conflict, and divergent strategic priorities mean any breakthrough will require sustained, patient negotiation rather than quick diplomatic wins. Observers say that while technical frameworks exist, bridging political will remains the central challenge to moving beyond rhetoric to a concrete arms control arrangement.