The familiar critique of recent Middle East policy claims that the United States and Israel, driven by ideology or influenced by vested interests, stumbled into a region they misunderstood and left it more unstable than they found it. That narrative is compelling because it explains failure as error. Yet another interpretation deserves equal attention: what looks like miscalculation may, in some respects, be the predictable product of aligned incentives. When multiple actors benefit from a state of ongoing friction, the result can resemble coordination even if no single mastermind is in charge. Recognizing that possibility reshapes how we judge outcomes and prescribe remedies.
If instability were purely accidental, the solution would be improved competence and clearer objectives. But when policies repeatedly produce a similar, durable equilibrium—one where conflict is intense enough to justify engagement but contained short of decisive resolution—the diagnosis changes. This pattern matches the concept of a managed tension: a deliberate or emergent condition in which governments, militaries and regional partners keep pressure calibrated to sustain their interests. Understanding this dynamic requires moving beyond intent to inspect the incentives embedded in bureaucracies, defence procurement, alliance politics and domestic constituencies.
Why patterns matter more than mistakes
Looking at decades of decisions, the striking feature is consistency. Actions by the United States, Israel and some Gulf states frequently produce the same strategic environment: volatility without decisive resolution. That outcome is commercially and politically useful to several players—arms suppliers, intelligence services, think tanks advising policy, and politicians who benefit from a national-security narrative. When these interests overlap, results that appear coordinated may simply be the manifestation of similar priorities. The key phrase is outcome alignment: different actors pursuing related aims will often create a stable pattern of behavior, where conflict becomes a resource rather than an accident.
What a “managed conflict” looks like
A managed conflict maintains a constant level of crisis that legitimizes continued involvement without forcing a terminal choice. Such a state supplies rationales for defense budgets, permanent basing, arms sales and diplomatic leverage. It also offers domestic political cover: leaders can claim vigilance against threats while avoiding the costs and uncertainties of a final settlement. Importantly, this is not necessarily the result of a single clandestine plot. Rather, it emerges from the interaction of multiple policies that, when taken together, ratify a long-term status quo in which instability is functionally valuable.
The JCPOA: an object lesson in unintended consequences
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) illustrates how a negotiated outcome can be reversed by incentives rather than by failure of the agreement itself. The accord was a detailed, multilateral arrangement, inspected by international monitors and backed by every permanent member of the UN Security Council plus Germany. Beyond its nuclear provisions, the JCPOA offered a pathway for Iran’s gradual reintegration into regional and global institutions. Iranian moderates staked much of their domestic credibility on this framework, and President Hassan Rouhani centered his political project on the idea that engagement would deliver tangible benefits for ordinary Iranians.
Consequences of withdrawal
The American decision to withdraw in 2018 did not simply terminate a treaty; it eroded the internal politics that had supported it. By pulling back, Washington shifted the debate inside Iran toward those who had long warned that engagement with the United States was futile. The withdrawal handed momentum to hardliners and hollowed out the reformist argument that had justified accommodation. Crucially, advocates of withdrawing never laid out a convincing endgame: the promised pressures did not plausibly lead to rapid regime change or to a superior bargain, since Iran had little reason to offer more from isolation than it had from engagement. This gap highlights a recurring pattern: process-driven decisions without a credible destination often realign incentives in ways that entrench instability.
Incentives, accountability and policy remedies
Recognizing that certain outcomes are useful to various actors leads to a different set of policy prescriptions. If persistent tension is an emergent equilibrium produced by overlapping interests, then correcting it requires altering those incentives: tightening oversight of military sales, demanding clearer strategic goals from allied governments, and designing diplomacy that rewards de-escalation rather than perpetuation. Transparent cost-benefit accounting, improved congressional or parliamentary scrutiny, and stronger multilateral institutions can reduce the attractiveness of a perpetual crisis as a policy tool. Ultimately, any effort to shift the balance will confront entrenched interests that benefit from the status quo.
The central question is not only whether mistakes were made, but whether those mistakes are being used as cover for a larger, self-sustaining logic. By reframing instability as a potential policy outcome—one that can be produced and preserved by aligned incentives—analysts and officials can move from assigning blame to designing remedies that disrupt the rhythm of managed conflict. That reframing opens space for strategies that prioritize durable resolution over cyclical engagement.
