The judge-led Independent Committee investigating the deadly Wang Fuk Court blaze reopened a new phase of evidential hearings after an initial series that began on March 19. The fire in November that killed 168 residents has produced a complex record of contractor reports, management messages and maintenance work. Recent testimony includes claims that when residents and staff tried to deploy hoses during the emergency, no water flowed, prompting renewed scrutiny of pre-fire repairs and coordination among firms responsible for the estate’s safety systems.
Committee sessions have pulled together witness statements, photographs, phone logs and tens of thousands of documents; over one million items of evidence have been catalogued so far. The new round of hearings will call back several contractors and management figures to reconcile conflicting accounts about who authorised shutdowns, when water tanks were refilled and why the estate’s fire safety system was effectively disabled in the months leading up to the tragedy.
Contractor testimony and disputed inspection records
Victory Fire Engineering, the registered fire service installation contractor that completed a routine inspection in March 2026, has returned to the witness stand. Its director and engineer described how staff told him roof tanks were undergoing maintenance and that their March check found no leaks. However, inspection forms later submitted bore entries suggesting problems with the tanks. The director said employees may have erred when completing paperwork and acknowledged he had not caught the inconsistency. Another worker testified that during the inspection the cement surfaces lacked tiles and showed no obvious leaks, a claim that the committee is probing against photographic and message evidence.
Unusual tiling works and quality assumptions
The estate’s maintenance specification included applying white tiles to the interior of the tanks — an approach the contractor described as uncommon for firefighting reserves because fire water tanks are designed to hold water for operational use rather than consumption. The tiling work reportedly stretched across several months, with the main contractor hiring a separate plumbing firm to apply for permissions to shut down the hydrant and hose network. That administrative route, and the long duration of works, are central to committee questions about whether standard safeguards were followed.
Shutdown approvals, power switches and timeline discrepancies
Evidence presented so far shows that a different specialist was engaged to process Fire Services Department notifications and that applications were filed repeatedly. The committee heard that the estate’s hydrant and hose circuit was formally taken offline multiple times and that the system effectively remained shut for a period starting in April 2026, lasting for more than six months in total. Victory Fire personnel discovered empty rooftop tanks in three blocks on Oct 16 and later determined all eight blocks were undergoing repairs. On Nov 19, they found the main power switch for the fire booster pump had been turned off in every block.
Conflicting management accounts and communications
Property management testimony has at times contradicted contractor claims. A management officer said she provided a formal shutdown notice to Victory Fire only after the fire, while committee counsel pointed to messages suggesting the tanks had been refilled — though available photos and timestamps raised questions about the timing of that refill. WhatsApp exchanges, internal photos and meeting records are being used to test who knew what and when. The committee has also heard about proxy voting practices at owners’ meetings and alleged gaps in how management verified participants and documented decisions related to safety works.
What the committee will examine next
The next phase of hearings will revisit key figures, including the Victory Fire director, to probe a 57-minute call he made with a technical officer at about 1:30 am on Nov 27, during the fire. Counsel will also pursue the sequence of applications filed to the Fire Services Department, the absence of onsite inspections by the firm that processed shutdown requests, and whether the extended outage of hydrant and hose systems reflected routine procedure or a deeper failure of coordination. Public registration for subsequent sessions is being opened online, and the panel intends to continue evidential hearings into May with details to be announced.
