The NATO Ankara Summit in 2026 is set against a backdrop of unprecedented challenges and shifting alliances. The transatlantic relationship has faced multiple breaking points this year, culminating in the Greenland crisis where the United States threatened to seize the territory of a fellow NATO member. This summit could redefine Europe’s role in its own defense and reshape the future of the alliance.
The Ankara Summit comes at a critical juncture, with Europe’s ability to deter Russian aggression on its eastern flank under serious scrutiny. As the last annual NATO gathering for some time, this meeting presents an opportunity to chart a more sustainable path for Europe’s defense, reducing dependency on the United States and fostering greater autonomy.
The End of Wishful Thinking
European leaders must recognize that a return to the pre-status quo is unlikely. The structural forces driving the United States to push Europe towards greater defense responsibility are only growing. The Iran war has depleted U.S. stockpiles of critical munitions, and strategic competition with China continues to dominate U.S. policy. Moreover, the Trump administration‘s hostile approach to Europe is expected to persist, affecting defense, technology, and economic policies.
Europe must act with urgency to prepare for a future where the United States plays a minimal role in conventional defense. The Ankara Summit should not be another exercise in placating President Trump with symbolic language and short-term concessions. Instead, European allies should demonstrate their readiness to take the reins of their own defense.
Charting a New Course for European Defense
To navigate this complex landscape, European allies should focus on three overarching priorities at the Ankara Summit.
Developing a Transition Plan for Burden Shifting
First, Europe needs a comprehensive plan to shift the burden of transatlantic defense. This plan should include clear timelines and milestones for taking over critical enablers of NATO operations, such as command and control, intelligence, and targeting capabilities. A pragmatic option, as proposed by Luis Simón and Stephen G. Brooks in Foreign Affairs involves co-financing U.S. enabling infrastructure. Payments delivered in phases, conditioned on continued U.S. provision, would raise the cost of disengagement for the United States.
Revitalizing the European Defense Industrial Base
Second, Europe’s major powers should formalize a political compact to place the European defense industrial base on a wartime footing. Defense industry executives have outlined the need for long-term contracts, predictable demand signals, and government action to shore up supply chains. Crucially, this effort must incentivize consolidation and reduce national biases in procurement, which have led to inefficient spending and duplicative platforms.
Analysis by McKinsey suggests that consolidating four critical upstream segments could deliver €45 billion in cumulative savings by 2030. For acute capability gaps, such as air defense munitions and long-range precision fires, Europe should leverage the EU’s organizational and fiscal capacity to launch crash production programs. This political agreement would send a strong signal to Washington that Europe is committed to a cohesive and coordinated rearmament process.
Addressing the Turkey-EU Question
Third, the Ankara Summit offers a natural venue to address the question of Turkey’s role in European defense. Tensions between Turkey and Cyprus have long been an obstacle to deeper NATO-EU relations. Allies should revisit the Berlin Plus agreement which provides the foundation for cooperation between the EU and NATO in crisis management. However, the current framework is no longer fit for purpose and requires reform to enable greater European defense responsibility.
One potential plan B for Europe, if the United States is not fully committed to NATO, is to provide EU member states greater access to NATO structures for a broader range of military scenarios. This would address the need for unanimous NATO agreement to enable the EU to take greater responsibility for European defense. Additionally, NATO and the EU should enhance their coordination and engagement in defense initiatives, ensuring that the EU’s institutional advantage in funding and military mobility schemes is fully leveraged.
Show of Resolve
None of these priorities amount to capitulation to the Trump administration or nostalgia for a pre-alliance. They serve as a concrete program for accelerated burden shifting, acknowledged as necessary by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. These priorities would also offer European leaders a tangible demonstration of resolve and effectiveness, addressing accusations of strategic drift.
Through a series of minor crises, NATO’s European members have so far avoided a catastrophic rupture with Washington. However, by not developing a backup plan to defend themselves, they are pushing their luck. The Ankara Summit is Europe’s last opportunity to shape an orderly transition of responsibility for the defense of Europe, rather than having one imposed by a revisionist Washington.
