The latest public-opinion snapshot released on April 24, 2026 shows a notable shift in how Russians report their views of President Vladimir Putin. According to the state pollster VTsIOM, the trust rating — defined as the share of respondents who say they personally trust the president — has slipped to 71 percent, while the approval rating — the share who rate his performance positively — stands at 65.6 percent. Those numbers mark the highest recorded shares of expressed distrust since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine: 24.1 percent say they do not trust Putin and 23.3 percent say they do not approve of his presidential performance. The changes were small in absolute terms, but they form part of a longer sequence of declines reported by the state pollster.
What the polls report and how they differ
VTsIOM released data showing a week-on-week drop in both measures: the approval figure fell by 1.1 percentage points from the prior week’s 66.7 percent to 65.6 percent, and the trust figure fell by about one point. The center published the results with an unexplained two-hour delay, which the press office attributed to technical issues; media observers noted the lag. At the same time, the rival survey organization FOM, whose results are often cited by the Presidential Administration, reports higher marks — 76 percent approve of Putin’s work and 74 percent say they trust him. The administration’s media advisers have encouraged outlets to favor the FOM figures or omit ratings entirely, according to a source inside a pro-government outlet.
Context: a trend of gradual decline
These latest entries continue a steady slide recorded by VTsIOM over several weeks; the polling center has documented declining approval for seven consecutive weeks through these releases. Earlier material published about the week of April 6–12 showed an approval mark of 66.7 percent and a trust rating near 72 percent. Analysts who work with Kremlin-affiliated teams attribute the trend to several overlapping pressures: the blocking of Telegram and targeted restrictions on mobile internet, consumer-level strain from rising prices, and accumulating war fatigue among the public. Those factors, the consultants argue, produce small but visible erosions in sentiment that have continued over multiple sampling cycles.
Party dynamics and competing measurements
Support for political groupings also shows movement. United Russia slipped to roughly 27.3 percent in the VTsIOM series, while smaller parties have inched upward: New People at about 12.4 percent, the Communist Party (KPRF) at 10.9 percent, LDPR at 10.8 percent, and A Just Russia near 5.2 percent. Those shifts are modest but relevant for how technologists and strategists inside the administration appraise electoral risks ahead of future votes.
Interpretations and the media environment
Political technologists and consultants interviewed by independent outlets stress that the downward movement is not caused by a single event but by a concatenation of grievances and media disruption. The internet restrictions — including the Telegram block and limits on mobile connectivity — were reported in mid-April as a concern for authorities because they may be depressing the president’s ratings. FOM’s own timeline shows a partial rebound in April: its report cited a rise to 76 percent approval from 74 percent on March 29. The contrast between the two major survey organizations complicates public narratives about political stability and leaves room for selective citation by different outlets.
What to watch next
Observers say the evolution of both trust and approval metrics will depend on several moving parts: whether internet restrictions are eased, how inflation and prices develop for ordinary households, and any change in public confidence related to the war. For now, the numbers published on April 24, 2026 by VTsIOM mark a high-water figure for expressed distrust since 2026, even as alternative polls like FOM report stronger levels of support. Close attention to methodology, timing, and official commentary will be essential for interpreting future shifts in Russian public opinion.
