The U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal, announced on July 22, 2026, has ignited a debate about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The agreement, which has not been publicly released, has raised concerns among experts who fear it could enable Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons capabilities.
U.S. President Donald Trump has stated that the deal requires Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel and includes a “no enrichment” clause. However, it is unclear whether these conditions are part of the signed agreement, leaving experts worried about the potential for uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia.
The UAE Model and Nonproliferation Concerns
The U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal diverges from the UAE model a 2009 agreement that prohibited uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. This agreement is considered the gold standard for nuclear cooperation deals and has been used as a benchmark for subsequent agreements.
The new Saudi-U.S. deal lacks similar restrictions, raising concerns that Saudi Arabia could gain access to key capabilities relevant to producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. This could spark a nuclear arms race in the region, particularly with Iran, Saudi Arabia’s traditional rival for influence.
Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Ambitions
Saudi officials have expressed interest in developing the full front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, which includes uranium mining and milling, uranium conversion, uranium enrichment, and fuel fabrication. The deal announced last week began with detailed discussions between Saudis and the U.S. during the Biden administration.
In, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman noted the kingdom’s interest in using a complete fuel cycle to develop nuclear fuel for two planned commercial power reactors. Mastering all of the processes involved in the front end of the fuel cycle, especially enrichment, would provide Saudi Arabia with the technical and industrial capability to produce weapons-grade uranium if it chose to pursue nuclear weapons.
Proliferation Risks and Latent Capabilities
The risk of Saudi Arabia having such capabilities for commercial purposes is high, given Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s public stance that Riyadh would acquire a nuclear weapon if Iran did. Experts agree that Iran has long had a latent nuclear weapons capability after it halted its full pursuit of nuclear weapons in 2003.
Were Saudi Arabia to desire a nuclear weapons program, a domestic capability to enrich uranium would be key. Mohamed ElBaradei, former director of the U.N. nuclear watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency, warned in a December 2006 statement on nuclear power that countries with these capabilities are “only a short step away from a nuclear weapons capability.”
Enrichment and the Black Box Facility
Prohibiting uranium enrichment in the Saudi deal would be the most direct way to prevent the Gulf kingdom from using civilian nuclear cooperation to learn the intricacies of uranium enrichment operations. However, the day before Trump’s comments suggesting “no enrichment,” U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said U.S. companies could build a black box enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia.
A black box facility would mean a U.S.-owned and operated enrichment site without direct Saudi input. The U.S. will reportedly use a study focused on the commercial viability of a Saudi enrichment capability to determine whether to proceed with such a facility. Precedent exists for building and operating a black box uranium enrichment plant to protect uranium enrichment technology.
Limiting Saudi access to enrichment technology would make it more difficult for Saudi Arabia to acquire the technical expertise needed for domestic enrichment capability. It also reduces the risk of Saudi Arabia diverting low-enriched uranium from a civilian program and further enriching it to weapons-grade levels. However, some experts have said that maintaining a black box facility with no Saudi personnel or involvement over the long term is unrealistic.
Plutonium Reprocessing and the Need for a Watchdog
Saudi officials have not discussed plutonium reprocessing publicly. However, reports suggest that the new deal will allow Saudi Arabia to reprocess nuclear fuel. Countries can use reprocessing to separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel for use in nuclear weapons.
Preventing material diversion in reprocessing plants is difficult due to many factors, including their size and complexity and the large amount of nuclear material processing occurring. The IAEA emphasizes the need to build safeguards into these facilities, such as measurement, surveillance, and verification systems.
Reducing the proliferation risk of Saudi nuclear capabilities would require robust implementation of IAEA safeguards and Saudi Arabia abiding by the terms of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. However, press reports suggest the U.S.-Saudi deal does not require Saudi Arabia to abide by the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.
The most effective way to reduce the proliferation risk of the deal is prohibiting indigenous Saudi uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. Should the U.S. allow enrichment, implementing a black box facility and stringent IAEA safeguards would mitigate any risk of Riyadh gaining expertise for a future nuclear weapons program.
